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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the impact of transaction costs on economic welfare and 
development. We extend the static model of Romer (1994), in which transaction costs 
reduce welfare by the reducing the equilibrium number of intermediate goods, and 
estimate the welfare losses in the case of domestic transaction costs. The main analysis of 
the paper extends a dynamic model of Ciccone and Matsuyama (1996) to incorporate 
transaction costs. We show that high transaction costs reduce the long-run level of 
development, and may arrest development completely in the extreme case. We also 
discuss the role of information technology in reducing transaction costs, and offer some 
preliminary evidence from rural India to illustrate how these reductions may occur 
through the use of such technologies.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The problem of economic development, or, rather, its lack, has bedeviled the 
world since colonialism ended, and former colonies became ‘developing countries.’ 
There have been some spectacular success stories, but also many failures of development. 
The result of over fifty years of diverse experiences has been a reasonable degree of 
agreement among professional economists as to the broad nature of the economic policies 
that must be followed to promote economic development. One can partly relate this 
intellectual convergence to the economic success of East Asia and the economic failure 
of the Soviet Union, both of which became clear only in the last decade or two. 
Coincidentally, the same period has seen the emergence of information technology (IT) 
as a major force for change in developed countries. While the virtues of IT have 
sometimes been overblown, one can assert relatively uncontroversially that IT has begun 
to have a significant impact on the lives of people in developed, industrialized countries, 
by changing the organization of work and modes of leisure, and by increasing 
productivity (e.g., Daveri, 2003; Jorgenson, 2001, 2004; Stiroh, 2002). 
 
The benefits of IT for developing countries are less clear-cut (Dedrick et al., 
2003; Kenny, 2003). IT can improve efficiency, make developing country firms more 
globally competitive, and bring many benefits to well-off consumers in these countries, 
whose consumption patterns are close to those of the developed world. From this 
perspective, IT is a rich-world tool, of limited relevance to the poor masses of developing 
countries, who lack basic health, sanitation and education. On the other hand, there have 
been numerous attempts to harness the power of IT in developing countries, to try to 
improve the delivery of such basic services, as well as provide other services that might 
have been deemed inaccessible to poor, isolated villagers. Dozens of case studies, 
newspaper articles and web sites describe various achievements in the use of IT to 
improve the lives of the poor in poor countries. 
 
What is chiefly missing from the debate on the role of IT in promoting economic 
development is a unifying conceptual framework for identifying the gains from IT for 
rural populations in developing countries. This paper provides a beginning in this 
direction by focusing on transaction costs, how IT affects them, and how they affect 
development. We argue that IT can significantly reduce the high transaction costs that 
face poor, rural populations, and that this can have a long-lasting positive impact on 
economic development. Since we rely on a combination of abstract modeling with 
informal empirical evidence through case studies, there is no claim that the argument 
presented here is conclusive – however, we provide a framework for further theoretical 
and empirical investigation.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a general discussion of the 
nature of transaction costs, and the concrete role of IT in reducing transaction costs for 
rural households in developing economies, as well as the more general impacts of IT. 
Section 3 provides the core of the paper’s analytical contribution. After summarizing 
some quantitative estimates of static efficiency losses from transaction costs for India, we 
extend Paul Romer’s (1994) influential analysis of the welfare effects of tariffs as 
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transaction costs, to the case where the transaction costs are domestic resource costs. 
Romer’s point is that allowing for the reduction in the number of produced goods 
increases the estimated welfare cost by an order of magnitude. We show that this insight 
extends to the domestic-cost case. Next, we show how the Romer-type welfare cost, 
identified in a static model, is exacerbated in a growth context. In particular, we extend a 
model of long-run development due to Ciccone and Matsuyama (1996) by introducing 
transaction costs. In this model, as transaction costs increase, they reduce the long-run 
level of development, and may even choke off development altogether. From the 
perspective of developing economies, this impact represents the most serious negative 
impact of high transaction costs.  Section 4 uses our own fieldwork in India, to examine 
how IT is used in practice, and to get some idea of its qualitative and quantitative 
impacts. Section 5 briefly concludes, with some more general thoughts on the role of IT 
in development, including impacts on inequality, expectations, and innovation processes. 
 
 
2. Transaction Costs and Information Technology1
  
While there is no standard definition of the term ‘transaction costs’, they can be 
broadly interpreted to include costs associated with market exchange, including costs of 
searching for options, negotiating contracts and enforcing agreements.2 Payments to 
transaction intermediaries can also be transaction costs, since, in such cases, the 
intermediary provides costly transaction services, rather than the parties bearing the costs 
directly. One can also interpret some transportation costs as transaction costs, since they 
may be required to identify a possible transaction, or to complete it. In this case, as in the 
case of intermediation, transaction costs are somewhat of a catch-all term for various 
economically valuable activities that facilitate economic exchanges. We will accept this 
limitation of the term ‘transaction cost,’ and highlight varying interpretations where 
necessary. 
 
Turning to the role of IT, its general economic benefit is that its use may lead to 
static and dynamic efficiency gains.3 Static gains are one-time, and come from more 
efficient use of scarce resources, allowing higher consumption in the present. More 
efficient use of resources can include improvements in operating efficiency, as well as 
reduced transaction costs, though the conceptual boundary between these two avenues 
                                                 
1 This section draws on Singh (2004). See also Singh (2002), and the concluding section of this paper for a 
broader discussion of the potential role of IT in development. See Kaushik and Singh (2004) for references 
to the growing literature on the subject. 
2 While Coase (1937) does not use the term, his ‘marketing costs’ are the essence of the modern concept. 
Williamson, for example (1975, 1981), extends the analysis of transaction costs to relationships within 
organizations.   
3 Equity is often paired with efficiency in concerns for welfare. Depending on how IT is deployed and 
accessed, the impact on inequality can go either way. However, to the extent that transaction costs are 
relatively higher for poorer people, the benefits of IT may be greater for the poor, if they can access IT-
based tools in an affordable manner. A related issue is that development can also include improvements in 
the capabilities of the population, such as education, health and nutrition, independently of the direct or 
indirect economic impact of these improvements. The ability to participate in democratic decision-making 
can also be placed in this category. IT may also effect improvements along these ‘non-economic’ 
dimensions: see Section 5 for further discussion. 
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may not always be hard and fast.4 Dynamic gains come from higher growth, potentially 
raising the entire future stream of consumption. Simply freeing up current resources 
through reducing transaction costs can lead to higher growth – in this case, the impacts of 
lower transaction costs are merely through a conventional channel. On the other hand, as 
we examine in Section 3, there may be less obvious consequences of transaction costs for 
growth.  
 
 To discuss the efficiency impacts of IT more concretely, note that IT refers to the 
electronic processing, storage and communication of information, where anything that 
can be represented in digital form is included in the term ‘information.’ Thus news, 
entertainment, personal communications, educational material, blank and filled-out 
forms, announcements, schedules, and so on are all information. Software programs that 
process data (searching, tabulating, and calculating, for example) are also information in 
this sense, representing a particular kind of intermediate good. We can use standard 
economic characterizations to classify the different kinds of information. For example, 
entertainment, personal communications, and sometimes news, are final goods. 
Educational material, job announcements, or some kinds of news (weather news for 
farmers, for example) are intermediate goods, typically used for improving income-
earning opportunities. Information about products and services available in the market is 
also an intermediate good, which can reduce transaction costs for those products. The 
ability to share information among users can impact the feasibility of providing it on a 
commercial basis: information goods typically have the characteristic that one person’s 
use does not reduce their availability for another person. The use of IT can dramatically 
increase the shareability of information, and this affects the economics of private and 
public provision of information goods and services. 
 
For both public and private provision, IT can increase efficiency by economizing 
on resource use in the operations of firms, as well as in market transactions. Information 
that would otherwise be conveyed through face-to-face contact, post, courier, print 
delivery, telegraph or telephone may instead be communicated in digital electronic form 
via the Internet. Digital technologies can also make telephones and printing more 
efficient, so the role of IT is much more pervasive than simply substitution of the Internet 
for existing methods. However, a central advantage of the Internet is its potential for 
enabling detailed two-way information exchange at relatively low cost.5 Efficiency 
benefits of IT are not restricted to just the process of communication. IT can make it 
possible to track and analyze communications, or, more generally, to store and retrieve 
information. In fact, word processing, maintaining accounts, inventory management, and 
many such activities that do not necessarily require long-distance communications or 
physical movement are also made more efficient by IT. 
 
                                                 
4 Essentially, this is because transaction costs can be interpreted to include internal firm decision-making 
and implementation costs, as well as market-related transaction costs. Also, the choice of whether market-
related transaction costs are incurred or not is endogenous to the system, and depends on the relative costs 
of organizing production in different ways: this is, of course, the basic insight of Coase (1937). 
5 Of course, IT also requires new investment, so the benefits of trips, time and paper saved must be 
weighed against the costs of installing and maintaining the new infrastructure. This is a standard economic 
calculation. 
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Experience with Internet use in developed countries suggests that information 
exchange related to the completion of market transactions is especially valuable. The 
ability of IT-based communications (combined with storage and processing) to bring 
together buyers and sellers more effectively represents major potential gains. These gains 
can come about through lower search costs, and the resulting improvement in matching 
of buyers and sellers. The successes of auction and employment websites in the US 
illustrate these gains. In a developing country, farmers selling their crops and buying 
inputs, parents seeking matrimonial alliances for their children, and job seekers are all 
potential users of Internet-based matching services. 
 
Efficiency gains of IT can also come about through the enabling of new goods 
and services. In many cases, the new good is related to something available earlier, but is 
presented in a form that reduces costs and expands the size of the market. For example, 
recorded music is a mass-consumption item, whereas only a small minority of the 
population could afford or have access to live performances by the highest quality 
musicians.  In this case, while digital recording reduced production costs, digital delivery 
has reduced transaction costs, and further expanded the market. Educational material is 
another example where recording and duplication can replace more expensive, skilled-
labor-intensive alternatives for delivery. The possibilities for interactivity with IT-based 
educational materials illustrate the advantages of IT over older technologies based only 
on recording and duplication. Long-distance interactive communication in educational 
contexts can also be considered as a reduction in transaction costs, since physical travel is 
eliminated or reduced. 
 
IT may also play an important role in reducing the transaction costs associated 
with the provision of public goods and with redistributive transfer payments. Citizens, 
especially in developing countries, typically incur private costs (often substantial) in 
availing of government-provided services.6  Reducing these costs requires the internal 
use of IT by government, as well as enabling the beneficiaries of government services 
(particularly the economically disadvantaged) to access IT resources. While governments 
may invest in such front-end interfaces with citizens (and have done so in developed 
countries), the cost of doing so for governments in developing countries may be 
prohibitive. Such governments typically already have difficulties in raising sufficient 
resources through taxes and user charges for traditional public sector activities. However, 
successful examples of implementation of ‘e-governance’ initiatives do exist.7 There is 
also a conceptual alternative that economizes on government resources. The use of IT can 
increase the scope for private provision of intermediary services that reduce the cost of 
access to government. Private intermediaries already help in filling out forms, getting 
access, and so on, but IT can reduce costs further, often by an order of magnitude. In 
broad terms (as is also the case with electronic marketplaces and job-matching boards), 
IT changes the scope and nature of intermediation. 
 
                                                 
6 These transaction costs include government officials illegally demanding ‘speed money’ or other 
payments, but also simply the costs of traveling and of waiting to be served.  
7 In India, these include Bhoomi in Karnataka, e-seva in Andhra Pradesh, Lokmitra in Rajasthan, and the 
CHOICE Project in Chattisgarh. See also Bhatnagar and Schware (2000) for further examples. 
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 In developing countries, ‘cyber kiosks’ are already common in cities and larger 
towns, with usage patterns often quite similar to those in developed countries. Urban 
population densities, income levels, cultural attitudes and telecommunications 
infrastructure all seem to be sufficient for the commercial success of these enterprises. 
The falling cost of hardware and a variety of software have also supported this trend. On 
the other hand, in rural areas the various demographic and socioeconomic variables may 
not be present in configurations that would easily enable the diffusion of commercial 
access to various IT-enabled services. Other barriers include the market power of 
traditional rural intermediaries and local language requirements and different demand 
patterns for software. Nevertheless, a case can be made that transaction costs are 
relatively8 very high in rural areas of developing countries, and that IT can bring those 
costs down. The issue may be one of cost-effective provision of IT access, rather than the 
absence of IT-based efficiency gains. 
 
We therefore briefly discuss, in somewhat more specific terms, the potential 
impacts of rural IT use in developing countries. Farmers’ input decisions include material 
inputs such as seeds, fertilizer and pesticides; and capital inputs such as tractors and land 
(whether through purchases or rentals); as well as the credit required for such purposes. 
The focus of analysis will be market transactions for inputs, in keeping with the emphasis 
on transaction costs. In all cases, there is a potential for benefiting through better 
information about prices, quality and availability. Labor is also an important input, but 
the labor market has special characteristics (lack of mobility, contracting, relationship 
factors, etc.) that reduce the importance of such information in rural contexts.  
 
Farm operations also include decisions with respect to quantity and timing of 
inputs. A crucial aspect of agricultural operations is risk management, as both the 
weather and pest incidence are extremely variable. Both ex ante decisions in the face of 
uncertainty and ex post responses to realizations of uncertainty are important. In this 
context, predictive and technical information both matter for agricultural operations. 
Marketing of outputs primarily requires price information. Increasingly, producing for 
sale also requires knowledge of quality requirements in different markets.9 Selling 
produce provides income for consumption, investment and inputs, as well as generating 
information that affects input and production decisions. 
  
Non-production decisions of rural households can be roughly divided into pure 
consumption activities and human capital investment, in education and health. The 
boundary is fuzzy, since even basic food consumption has nutritional impacts and 
therefore a human capital component. These activities generate impacts on operations, 
since they affect the quality of decision-making, as well as household labor inputs. While 
poorer households may be severely limited in their consumption, a significant proportion 
of rural households in countries such as India have incomes sufficient to support some 
                                                 
8 While urban residents may also face significant transaction costs in making purchases, or accessing 
government services, they may be lower in absolute terms than for rural populations, because the latter face 
higher transportation costs, and they may also be lower relative to incomes. 
9 This reflects increased processing of food products, as well as greater exports to markets where regulatory 
standards for quality and consumer consciousness are significant. 
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discretionary consumption. In some cases, consumption may be only superficially 
discretionary – social norms may dictate spending on activities relating to marriage and 
other life cycle events. Finally, household saving is not feasible for all rural households, 
but is an activity of growing importance. Saving may be for consumption smoothing, 
investment, or precautionary reasons. 
  
Even this simplified and summary picture of rural households’ economic activity 
illustrates that they engage in a broad range of transactions and decisions with economic 
impacts. What is noteworthy besides this complexity is that many decisions are made 
with very limited information, and that market interactions are often subject to high 
transaction costs, due to imperfections in information, high transportation costs (also 
often a form of transaction cost), inefficient intermediation and time delays. High 
transaction costs will always prevent marginal transactions from being undertaken; in 
extreme cases, the market may fail to function at all. Given this situation, the potential 
role of IT can be understood in terms of reducing transaction costs, as well as improving 
the efficiency of decision making within households (both as producers and as 
consumers). 
  
Reductions in communication and transaction costs are particularly beneficial 
where they can allow new markets to develop, in the sense that existing goods and 
services, otherwise restricted to urban areas, or to a very limited segment of rural 
populations, now can be offered to broad cross-sections of the rural population. Examples 
include financial services, particular types of education, health services, long distance 
communications, and expertise on a range of production-related decisions. Whether this 
can be done in a sustainable manner depends on the supply conditions for IT-based rural 
services. 
 
 It must be further understood that the activities outlined, in the above discussion 
take place within a particular institutional environment. This includes private actors as 
well as governments. For example, farmers may obtain credit and inputs from, as well 
contract their output to, private ‘commission agents,’ even in the presence of government 
procurement and government-run local markets. Governments play a major role in 
subsidizing inputs, providing infrastructure, and enforcing property rights. To the extent 
that these activities are also subject to inefficiencies, it may be the case that, in order to 
be successful, IT-based interventions geared towards rural households will have to 
simultaneously alter the institutional environment, or else achieve sufficient scale and 
scope in order to impel changes in it. We will take this up briefly in Sections 4 and 5. 
 
 
3. Modeling Transaction Costs and Development 
 
The simplest and most basic aspect of transaction costs is that they result in 
resources used up in exchange, and drive a wedge between the supply price and the 
demand price. To quantify the resource costs, or overall welfare effects, one needs a 
specific model. 
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Linear competitive model  
In a simple, single-market linear model of competitive supply and demand (e.g., 
Bussolo and Whalley, 2002), we have  
 
dd bQaP −=  (1)
ss QcP +=  (2)
sd QQ =  (3)
tPP sd +=  (4)
 
In equation (4), t is the unit transaction cost, which has a negative impact on 
equilibrium quantity, as seen in the following expression. 
 
db
tcaQe +
−−=  (5)
 
If transaction costs are high enough, the market does not exist, in the sense that 
the quantity exchanged is zero. If the transaction cost is purely resources used up in the 
process of exchange, then the welfare loss from its existence consists of the usual 
Harberger deadweight loss triangle, as well as the rectangle associated with the product 
tQe, which can be substantially larger. If the transaction cost is actually a payment to an 
intermediary, or a tax imposed by the government, then the welfare loss is just the 
Harberger triangle. One can argue that, if transaction costs are high, perhaps even high 
enough to lead to a zero equilibrium quantity, then even the Harberger triangle can be 
quite a substantial welfare loss, and this may be a useful point to make for developing 
countries such as India. 
 
Using the above model and variants, Bussolo and Whalley (2002) arrive at 
estimates of the welfare losses of transaction costs in general equilibrium in an open 
economy.10 Their simulations consider 50% reductions in exogenous transaction costs in 
goods markets for all goods and all agents. Using data for the Indian economy, real 
household income in these simulations rises about 6% to 13% in response to the 
transaction cost reduction, depending on the specifics of the model. Bussolo (2001) 
performs a similar exercise with data for Colombia, and obtains real household income 
increases that range from about 2% to 13% for the various models. The gains here 
include the transaction cost rectangles (tQe,), as well as the Harberger triangles. 
 
The Romer model: Endogenous number of goods 
The CGE exercises provide a useful indication of the static efficiency gains from 
reducing transaction costs, but that is all. They tell us nothing about the long run impacts 
on growth or development. Romer (1994), in an influential paper, takes an important step 
in that direction. He argues that even if the rectangles (tQe,) represent a redistribution, 
                                                 
10 The CGE models used in this case have theoretical antecedents in treatments of general competitive 
equilibrium with transaction costs such as Foley (1970) and Hahn (1971). These models take the number of 
goods as given, and focus on existence of equilibrium rather than welfare issues. 
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and not a resource cost, there is a welfare cost that goes well beyond the usual Harberger 
triangles. The basic idea is that if there is a fixed cost of producing a good, transaction 
costs can reduce operating profits to the extent that some goods are no longer produced, 
leading to a larger loss of welfare than would otherwise be the case. Note that the 
transaction costs can be smaller than would be required to lead to zero quantity in the 
simple competitive case above. 
 
The essentials of Romer’s model and demonstration of welfare losses are as 
follows. Output is assumed to be a function of labor, L, and a large number of different 
types of capital goods, indexed by i. 
 
∑ = αα−= Ni ixLY 11  (6)
 
This is a simple special case of a more general CES aggregation of the 
differentiated capital goods, where the CES parameter is assumed equal to α (Romer, 
1994, p. 27). Each of the capital goods has a fixed cost of production given by c0, and it is 
further assumed that the goods are arranged so that c0 is increasing in i, and that the 
dependence is linear, or c0(i) = μi. 
 
Romer focuses on tariffs as the transaction costs in this model, so all capital goods 
are assumed to be potentially produced by foreign entrepreneurs. The cost c0 in this case 
can be assumed to be an entry cost for the local market – the model is static at this stage. 
Good N is the marginal good in the absence of transaction costs. There is a single 
producer of each type of capital good.11 Since the capital goods enter the production 
function (6) symmetrically, each of them faces the same inverse demand, given by the 
value of the marginal product of the input. Using the output as the numeraire, this is 
simply the marginal product, so that the inverse demand for good i is  
 
11)( −αα−α= iii xLxp  (7)
 
There is an ad valorem tariff, t, on all of the purchases of the foreign capital 
goods, so that if the firm selling good i chooses to enter, its profit maximization problem 
is  
max x xcxxpt i 1)()1( −−  (8)
 
Here c1 is the constant marginal cost of production. The result of this maximization is a 
proportional markup on marginal cost 
 
                                                 
11 As pointed out to me by Abhijit Banerjee and Dilip Mookherjee, this is a significant assumption, since 
adjustment takes place at the level of varieties rather than the number of firms producing a particular 
variety. If there are several potential firms producing each variety, or if individual firms produce several 
varieties, the nature of competition and pricing becomes more complex, but it seems that fixed costs of 
producing varieties will still have the same effect, in that transaction costs will reduce the number of 
varieties. 
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)1(/)( 1
* tctpi −α=  (9)
 
Substituting this in (7), we solve for equilibrium output, assuming that the producer is 
profitable.  
 
Ltctx )1/(1)1/(11
)1/(2* )1()( α−α−−α− −α=  (10)
 
Also, substituting (9) in (8), we have that equilibrium profit, before fixed costs of entry 
are deducted, is 
 
αα− /)1)((*1 txc  (11)
 
Equating this to c0(i) = μi and solving, we derive the expression for the marginal good in 
equilibrium: 
 
αμα−= /)1)(()( *1 txctN  (12)
 
Domestic income is obtained by substituting (10) and (12) in (6), and national 
income is given by   
 
)()()1()( tYttYtY DOMDOMNAT α+α−=  (13)
 
The first term on the right hand side of (13) is labor’s share of domestic product, while 
the second term is tariff revenue. Romer goes on to demonstrate the difference in welfare 
cost when the number of capital goods in assumed to be fixed at N(0), versus the case 
where it is determined in equilibrium as a function of the tariff rate, t. In particular, he 
shows that, when α = 0.5, 
 
2
)0()0(
)(1 t
Y
tY
NN
NAT
NAT =− =  (14)
 
whereas 
 
4322
)0(
)(1 ttt
Y
tY
NAT
NAT +−=−  (15)
 
In the first case, a tariff rate of 10% implies a drop in national income of 1%, but in the 
second case, where the impact of the tariff on the equilibrium number of capital goods 
used is accounted for, the decrease is 19.8%. 
 
 Romer’s important insight has led to several papers that try to quantify the 
impacts of trade liberalization on the economy, in terms of leading to new goods being 
traded. While these empirical studies do not necessarily correspond precisely to Romer’s 
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theoretical model, they point out impacts of trade liberalization that are similar in spirit. 
Kehoe and Ruhl (2003) find substantial increases in the number of goods traded, for 
bilateral trade flows for the countries in NAFTA and in the European Union. Panagariya 
(2004) reports similar results for India, based on work by one of his doctoral students. 
Funke and Ruhwedel (2003) find substantial increases in product variety in international 
trade for 14 central and eastern European countries after the fall of the Soviet Union.12
 
The Romer model modified 
 The empirical studies above have all focused on tariffs as a cause of suboptimal 
product variety and resultant welfare losses. As Romer (1994) notes in his general 
discussion, but does not emphasize in his modeling, his insight applies to any form of 
transaction costs, not just tariffs.13 Thus, communication and search costs for domestic 
goods, which are most directly affected by information technology, can have the same 
effects. Therefore, suppose that the parameter, t, represents a resource cost for 
transactions that is proportional to revenue, but that the suppliers of the capital goods are 
domestic firms. Then we have 
 
)()1()()1()( tYttYtY DOMDOMNAT α−+α−=  (16)
 
The first term is the same as in equation (13), but the second term is the total payment 
received by the domestic capital goods producers.14 In this case, again with α = 0.5, the 
welfare loss when the reduction in the number of goods is accounted for is higher, but 
only by a multiple, and not an order of magnitude. Specifically, we have, 
 
  
2
)0( 5.05.1)0(
)(1 tt
Y
tY
NN
NAT
NAT −=− =  (17)
and  
 
432 464
)0(
)(1 tttt
Y
tY
NAT
NAT −+−=−  (18)
 
Thus, transaction costs that are 5% of revenue result in income losses of approximately 
7.5% and 20%, respectively. While the difference is not as striking as in Romer’s 
calculations, it is still economically significant. 
 
                                                 
12 Hummels and Klenow (2002) also examine product variety in trade, but in the context of the impacts of 
countries’ size and other characteristics. 
13 In the context of international trade, iceberg trade costs (which include transportation costs), as applied 
by, e.g., Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) are modeled similarly. 
14 Here we assume that the resources used up by transaction costs are simply a waste, and do not show up in 
the national income accounting. On the other hand, fixed and variable costs of capital goods producers are 
payments to domestic labor, and so are included in national income. I am grateful to T.N. Srinivasan for 
clarifying this assumption. One can alter the specific assumptions of what is pure waste and what is paid to 
others, without altering the thrust of the calculations that follow. 
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Another possibility is that transaction costs are proportional to profit rather than 
revenue. In this case, the calculations must be modified more thoroughly. In particular, 
the equilibrium price becomes pi* = c1/α, independent of t, and the expression for 
equilibrium use of the capital goods is also modified, and is independent of the 
transaction cost. However, profit still depends on t, and so does the number of capital 
goods produced and used. In this case, the Romer result on order of magnitude 
differences again does not hold, but, as in the previous case, there is a multiplier 
difference, close to a factor of two. In particular, for any α, 
 
t
Y
tY
NN
NAT
NAT =− = )0()0(
)(1  
(19)
 
while 
 
22
)0(
)(1 tt
Y
tY
NAT
NAT −=−  (20)
 
 One should not read too much into the comparisons. In particular, they should not 
be used to infer that tariffs are worse than domestic transaction costs. The point is really 
to emphasize the generality of Romer’s insight.  
 
Welfare effects of transaction costs in a dynamic model 
If one is interested in development, the main implication of domestic transaction 
costs, i.e., their effect on the equilibrium number of intermediate goods, and hence on 
output and welfare, must be sought in a dynamic model. Romer hints at this link, since he 
informally relates his discussion to the branch of “new” growth theory that emphasizes 
growth through endogenous innovation (Romer, 1994, p. 6). Here we make this 
connection somewhat more precise, using the analysis of Ciccone and Matsuyama 
(1996). 
 
 Ciccone and Matsuyama (CM) use a dynamic monopolistic competition model, in 
which an economy that inherits a small range of differentiated intermediate inputs can be 
trapped into a lower stage of development.15 In particular, their model may have multiple 
steady state equilibria, and the starting point of the economy can determine which steady 
state is approached. How the intuition of the Romer model will be used in our analysis is 
straightforward. If transaction costs determine the initial conditions in terms of the 
number of varieties of the intermediate good, then reducing transaction costs may 
jumpstart the economy, moving it to a path that leads to a higher steady state. In addition, 
transaction costs will affect the long-run equilibrium number of varieties, and hence the 
level of the steady state. We sketch a version of the CM model with the addition of 
                                                 
15 As Ciccone and Matsuyama point out, their basic model is very similar to that of Grossman and Helpman 
(1991, Ch. 3.1) – the crucial difference being that substitution between labor and differentiated capital 
goods is allowed. This alternative assumption drives the equilibrium possibilities discussed later in this 
paper. 
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transaction costs, and indicate how the impact of reduced transaction costs plays out in 
the context of the model. 
 
 The model is set in continuous time. In this economy households that supply labor 
inelastically, and have a logarithmic instantaneous utility function for the single 
consumption good.  Intertemporal utility maximization gives the standard Euler 
condition, where Ct is consumption, ρ is the subjective discount rate, and Rt is the 
cumulative interest factor up to time t. 
 
ρ−= t
t
t R
C
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 The consumption good is produced by identical competitive firms, with CRS 
production technology described by ),( ttt HXFC = , where Ht is labor input (with 
competitive wage rate of wt) and Xt is the composite of the differentiated intermediate 
inputs, which, in this dynamic model, must be interpreted as perishable producer services 
rather than capital goods. However, this is basically the same specification as Romer 
(1994) and similar growth models. Here, a continuum of inputs is assumed, and, unlike in 
Romer’s example, the CES elasticity is not pinned down to any parameter of the 
production function, though it is assumed that σ > 1. We have 
 
( ) )1/(
0
/11)(
−σσσ− ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡= ∫ tn tt diixX  (22)
 
Growth in this economy comes about through an increase in the number of varieties of 
intermediate inputs, nt. In fact, factor productivity increases with the range of 
differentiated inputs. By symmetry, x(i) = x, so, from (22), the productivity of 
intermediate inputs is X/nx = n1/(σ - 1), which is increasing in n as long as σ > 1. One way 
to introduce transaction costs into this framework is to assume that some fraction, say τ1, 
of the composite input Xt is consumed by such costs. In this case, the production function 
becomes .),)1(( 1 ttt HXFC τ−= 16 However, we will pursue a more fruitful alternative 
below. 
 
 As in Romer (1994), and other such models, the supply of intermediate goods is 
characterized by monopolistic competition: each differentiated input is produced by a 
single firm, which faces a demand curve with constant price elasticity, σ. Each input uses 
only labor in production, with constant returns. Following Ciccone and Matsuyama, the 
unit labor requirement is aX, but the units of measurement are chosen to make this equal 
to (1 - 1/σ ). Profit maximization implies marginal revenue equals marginal cost, or, in 
the absence of transaction costs, 
 
                                                 
16 It is important to reiterate that the transaction cost parameters in these abstract models can have varying 
interpretations, and can stand for a wide range of technologically- or policy-induced costs: this is to be 
expected at this level of abstraction. 
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Using the normalization for aX, we have, simply, tt wip =)( .  
 
The CM model extended to include transaction costs 
If we introduce transaction costs at this stage of production, as in the static Romer 
(1994) model discussed earlier, the equilibrium price becomes, instead,  
 
)1/()( 2τ−= tt wip  (24)
 
Using (24), the price index for the composite intermediate good is 
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Note that Pt is decreasing in nt, the number of varieties. 
 
Since the final goods sector is perfectly competitive, the gross share, say α, of the 
composite intermediate good in the final output is given by the expression FXX/F, but 
only a fraction, (1-τ2), is received by the intermediate goods firms, while the remaining 
fraction is lost through transaction costs. With transaction costs in the use of the 
composite input, FX = (1-τ1)F1, so transaction costs also reduce the input’s share by 
reducing its marginal productivity. Also, since F is a CRS function, the input share 
depends only on the relative input price, so α = α(P/w).  
 
For simplicity, we shall focus only on the second source of transaction costs, and 
set τ1 equal to zero for the rest of the analysis. Using (25), we have, 
 
),())1/(( 22
)1/(1 τ≡τ−α=α σ− ttt nAn  (26)
 
The function A is increasing in nt, as long as the elasticity of substitution between X and 
H, say θ, is greater than one.17 The function A now also depends on τ2, and will be 
decreasing in the second argument as long as θ > 1. Intuitively, as intermediate goods 
producers increase prices to compensate for transaction costs, higher substitutability of 
labor for their inputs reduces their share. Their net share, (1-τ2)α, is even lower, and is 
also decreasing in τ2. 
 
 For any variety, using symmetry, we can drop the index i, and write net profit as  
 
στ−=−τ−=π /)1())1(( 22 ttttXtt xpxwap  (27)
 
                                                 
17 CM provide references that argue for the empirical plausibility of this assumption. 
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where the second equality follows from the normalization for aX. 
Now, net revenue for all varieties of the intermediate goods is 
, where the right hand side is the net input share. However, 
consumption is now less than output, as a result of the transaction costs measured by τ2.  
The share of output lost through these transaction costs is 
ttttt Fxpn ατ−=τ− )1()1( 22
2ταt . Hence, the share of 
intermediate goods firms in consumption is )1/()1( 22 τα−τ−α tt . Hence, we get, using 
(26),18
 
σττ−τ−τ=π ttttt nnACnA )),(1/()1)(,( 2222  (28)
  
 Following CM, assume that the number of firms starts at n0, that there is free 
entry subject to a start-up cost of an units of labor per intermediate variety, and that these 
costs are financed through issuing ownership shares.19 Let vt be the value of any 
intermediate goods firm.  Then, in equilibrium, we have: 
 
0)(,0, =−≥≥ ttntttnt nvawnvaw &&  (29)
 
Since the market value of an intermediate goods firm is equal to the present value of its 
profits, we get 
 
tttt Rvv && =+π /)(  (30)
 
Letting V = v/C (the ratio of firm value to consumption), and using (21), 28) and (30), we 
get  
 
σττ−τ−τ−ρ= ttttt nnAnAVV )),(1/()1)(,( 2222& (31)
 
When  (31) yields an analogue of CM’s (VV) curve (expressing V as a function of 
n) in a phase diagram of the economy’s dynamics: see Figure 1.
0=tV&
20 In our extension with 
transaction costs, the curve depends also on τ2, and shifts in V-n space as τ2 changes. The 
nature of this shift depends on how the term )),(1/()1)(,( 2222 ττ−τ−τ tt nAnA responds to 
changes in τ2.  A necessary and sufficient condition for this expression to be decreasing 
in τ2 is that is increasing in τ2. We shall assume that this property holds, so 
that the (VV) curve shifts downward as τ2 increases. We discuss the implications of this 
property later in this analysis. Note that as long as 
22),( ττtnA
),( 2τtnA  is increasing in n, then so is 
                                                 
18 This equation reduces to equation (7) in CM when transaction costs are zero. 
19 These start-up costs can also involve transaction costs. Romer quotes de Soto (1989), in reference to a 
test case conducted in Peru in 1983, where it took four university students 289 days of full time work to get 
the 11 permits needed to legally open a small garment assembly shop. Such transaction costs may also be 
reduced by the use of IT, though clearly policy changes are also required. 
20 For comparison, equation (31) reduces to CM equation (13a) when transaction costs are zero. 
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the term )),(1/()1)(,( 2222 ττ−τ−τ tt nAnA : hence the qualitative properties of the VV-
locus are unaffected by the presence of transaction costs. 
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Figure 1: Long-run equilibrium and sample dynamic path (θ ≤σ) 
 
 
Next, assuming that the total supply of labor is L, equilibrium in the labor market 
is given by  
 
tXtttn xanHnaL ++= &  (32)
 
We substitute the following equalities, for payments to intermediate goods and labor in 
the production of the final good, into (32): 
)1/()1()1( 222 τα−τ−α==τ− ttttttttt Cxwnxpn  
)1/()1( 22 τα−τ−α−= ttttt CHw  
 
Hence, we have 
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This simplifies to  
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Rearranging and using (29), we have:21
 
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
σττ−
τ−τ−−= 0,1
)),(1(
)1)(,(1max
22
22
tt
t
n
t VnA
nA
a
Ln&
(35)
 
Setting the first term in the outside brackets equal to zero, and expressing V as a function 
of n (and τ), one obtains the generalization of CM’s (NN) curve in V-n space (again, see 
Figure 1). Differentiation with respect to τ2 shows that the (NN) curve shifts upward as 
transaction costs increase, given our assumption that 22),( ττtnA is increasing in τ2. Note 
that here the impact of an increase in transaction costs is similar to that of an increase in 
start-up costs, but the latter has no impact on the (VV) curve. 
 
 We can now begin to discuss the dynamic implications of transaction costs in this 
model, i.e., the implications for development. First, consider the case, where θ ≤σ. CM 
show that there is a unique intersection of the (VV) and (NN) curves, which is the lowest 
steady state equilibrium, and this result carries over to our extension. This is shown in 
Figure 1, where the intersection occurs at n*. If the economy begins to the left of n*, it 
converges to n*. To the right of n*, the number of intermediate goods firms does not 
change, and the economy stays on the corresponding point on (VV). Here, initial 
conditions do not matter ‘too much’, since any economy starting to the left of n* will end 
up at the same steady state. Thus, the impact of transaction costs on initial conditions, as 
emerges from the Romer (1994) model, is muted in the long run. However, transaction 
costs affect the steady state itself, as one would expect. An increase in τ2 shifts (VV) 
downward and (NN) upward, thereby reducing n*, and hence the long run level of 
development. This implication is summarized as Proposition 1. 
 
Proposition 1 In the CM model extended to include transaction costs, when θ ≤σ, an 
increase in those costs reduces the unique long run equilibrium level of development. 
 
 Alternatively, if F has a CES form with θ >σ , there are three possibilities, as 
shown in Figure 2a-c.22 Now (VV) is no longer downward sloping everywhere, but has 
the possible humped shape as illustrated. In Figure 2a, (NN) lies completely above (VV), 
and any point on (VV) is a steady state – no development takes place. In Figure 2b, (NN) 
intersects (VV) twice, both where (VV) is downward sloping. If the economy starts 
below nL*, it stays there, on (VV). Slightly above this level, it converges to nH*. Finally, 
in Figure 2c, (NN) intersects (VV) twice, the lower intersection being where (VV) is 
upward sloping. In this case, even if n0 is just below nL*, expectations that are optimistic 
enough may generate dynamics that take the economy to the steady state with nH* 
intermediate goods firms. It is clear that transaction costs have two potential impacts, in 
this case. First, they can reduce n0, and thereby increase the likelihood that the economy 
stays in a low-level equilibrium. Second, by shifting the (NN) and (VV) curves, they can 
reduce the likelihood that any given n0 is high enough to generate development, and, 
                                                 
21 Equation (34) generalizes CM equation (10) and (35) generalizes CM equation (13b). 
22 This can be generalized to non-CES forms, as is made clear in Ciccone and Matsuyama’s Proposition 2. 
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even if development takes place, they can reduce the long run equilibrium level of 
development. Thus, for example, lowering transaction costs might shift the economy 
from case 2a to case 2b, and ‘get it going’ out of an initial stagnant state. The 
implications for this alternative scenario are summarized in Proposition 2. 
 
Proposition 2 In the CM model extended to include transaction costs, when θ >σ, an 
increase in those costs definitely reduces the long run equilibrium level of development, 
and may even arrest development completely. 
 
 To summarize the entire modeling exercise, we have proceeded by examining 
three levels of impact of transaction costs. First, there are the standard direct resource 
costs, which are larger than just the deadweight loss triangles. These resource costs are 
well understood and widely acknowledged. Second, there are additional losses of 
consumer surplus through reductions in the number of varieties produced. These costs 
were highlighted by Romer (1994), with an emphasis on tariffs, but also with a clear 
statement that the analysis applies to general transaction costs. We showed how the 
Romer analysis could be extended to the case of domestic transaction costs, in which case 
the additional welfare loss from losing varieties is still large, though not by an order of 
magnitude. The Romer analysis is static, but points the way toward incorporation in a 
dynamic model. We have done this here by extending a model of Ciccone and 
Matsuyama (1996). The third impact of transaction costs is in possibly arresting the 
process of development, and/or reducing its long-run level. While we have not quantified 
the welfare loss in this case, the extreme possibility of arrested development due to high 
transaction costs points to their potentially severe impact on long-run welfare. In the next 
section, we relate this abstract analysis to case studies of IT use for transaction cost 
reduction. 
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Figure 2: Alternative long-run equilibria (θ >σ ) 
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4. Rural Information Technology Use in India 
 
 We use case studies from India to illustrate the potential impact of IT on rural 
development, particularly through the reduction of transaction costs. We can relate the 
discussion to the dynamic model in the previous section by interpreting the intermediate 
goods in that model either as the outputs of rural farm households, or as their inputs – in 
the latter case, we think of the homogeneous final good as ‘food,’ or whatever crop is 
being grown. Either interpretation is possible, because it appears that both the range of 
inputs used by farmers in developing countries such as India, and the range of outputs 
that they produce, are constrained by high transaction costs. Our goal is to provide 
concrete illustrations of transaction costs reductions and their effects.23 In practice, their 
full impact remains to be seen, both in terms of static efficiency gains and of long run 
growth. In that respect, the link between the case studies and the modeling is tentative: 
nevertheless, this paper represents a significant first attempt to provide conceptual 
underpinnings for the understanding the development impacts of rural IT use in 
developing countries.24  
 
Drishtee 
Drishtee.com had its origins in Gyandoot, a government project in Dhar district of 
Madhya Pradesh state, in central India. Gyandoot provided an intranet for 33 village 
information kiosks, offering a range of mainly e-governance-related services. The most 
prominent of these was land record certificates, which are needed by landowners for 
transactions such as sale or leasing of land. While Gyandoot was a specific local 
initiative, involving heavy support from the local administration, Drishtee has attempted 
to take that model and replicate it across the country. Currently, Drishtee has a few 
hundred rural Internet kiosks in several states, run by franchisees according to a revenue 
sharing arrangement. In Drishtee’s case, a kiosk has, at least initially, just one computer. 
The set-up cost is in the range of Rs. 50,000 (approximately US $1,200).  
 
With the origins in Gyandoot playing a role, simple e-governance, such as making 
government forms available and allowing a variety of complaints to be relayed to the 
district level government, has typically been the lead service in setting up operations in a 
new district. Informal partnerships with district level government officials (both state and 
local government employees) have been significant. For example, in Sirsa and Jaipur 
districts, Drishtee was able to act as an intermediary for information exchange between 
                                                 
23 We will not discuss issues of implementation and commercial feasibility. Those aspects are outlined in 
Singh (2004), on which this section does draw heavily. However, it is worth emphasizing here that falling 
costs of hardware, development of local software applications, and significant organizational innovations 
have all made rural IT provision at least close to economically sustainable on a large scale. In this 
interpretation of the dynamic model of Section 3, the provision of IT-based services to farmers represents 
new varieties of intermediate producer services, or lower transaction costs for existing services. In this 
case, a single firm may provide several varieties of services. 
24 Our treatment of several rural-IT initiatives in India is based on field visits conducted over a two-and-a-
half year period, from December 2001 to July 2004, as well as discussions with various members of each 
organization. It does not reflect the views of any of the individuals or the organizations they represent. 
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the district government and constituents. It obviously is limited in its ability to improve 
the internal functioning of government. Expanding the range of services has meant tying 
up with content partners, particularly organizations such as Agriwatch, which provides a 
substantial quantity and range of agricultural information to farmers, including global 
market prices, crop research, weather information, and web store fronts for inputs. 
Agriwatch is essentially developing into a large-scale Internet portal for farmers, and 
Drishtee’s role can be seen as providing last-mile access to this rich information, through 
its kiosks. It is difficult to quantify the benefits of this service, but its popularity with 
farmers suggests that it is valuable. Related examples from the cases of ITC and n-Logue 
will provide a more definite assessment of these benefits.   
 
Drishtee’s pricing scheme for e-governance services follows a set model. The full 
cost of a transaction such as obtaining, filling out and submitting a government form is 
estimated, including imputing the value of time spent in travel. The kiosk owner’s fee for 
this is then set at about 10 percent of the estimated transaction cost, also taking into 
account possible willingness-to-pay considerations in choosing “pricing points” such as 
Rs. 5, 10 or 20. Assuming that these fees can cover the full cost of the kiosk owner and 
Drishtee (which depends largely on generating sufficient volume) the saving in 
transaction costs is substantial. The savings in such cases are generated by reductions in 
travel and time costs. There may also be benefits in terms of improving the effectiveness 
of transactions (e.g., if a complaint through this channel is more likely to be addressed), 
but these are harder to quantify. 
 
In the case of other services, such as matching buyers and sellers, or providing 
horoscopes or matrimonial advertising, additional services require partners who can 
provide software, maintenance, content or other components of the complete service. 
Education has played a limited role in Drishtee’s offerings, though kiosk owners have 
often used the presence of a computer and peripherals to offer computer training, as well 
as other offline services such as printing and games. The benefits in these examples are 
reductions in transaction costs for existing transactions, improved quality of successful 
matches, and potentially most significant, completion of investment and consumption 
activities (e.g., training, entertainment, and long-distance communications) that would 
otherwise not take place because of high transaction costs. 
 
N-Logue 
 While Drishtee is mostly active in northern and eastern India, n-Logue has its 
origin in the south of India, and its chief presence there and in western India. It is a for-
profit corporation, with majority ownership residing with a nonprofit organization. The 
main impetus for n-Logue came from the research group headed by an IIT Madras 
professor, Ashok Jhunjhunwala. This group has been responsible for a stream of 
hardware and software innovations that enable rural IT-based service delivery, through 
connectivity and applications. N-Logue aims to make kiosks commercially viable serving 
populations as small as 1500. It is the currently the second largest organization in this 
field, supporting over 1000 rural-IT kiosks. 
 
Transaction Costs, Information Technology and Development 21
N-Logue has progressed beyond being simply a connectivity provider, to 
delivering a range of services – these can be adapted to different connectivity 
technologies. The IIT group has been able to develop video applications that are 
sufficiently compressed to work within existing bandwidth constraints. N-Logue also has 
access to a range of software innovations for delivery and implementation of various 
applications in the fields of education, health and agriculture. For example, web cams 
have been used for remote diagnostics for diseases of people, animals and plants. 
Distance learning programs have also been developed. A considerable amount of local 
language software has been created quite rapidly and effectively to support these 
applications. In many of these cases, the transactions (eye exam, animal check-up, 
learning basic computer skills, etc.) would not have taken place for many of the 
households involved, because the costs of obtaining these services by more traditional 
means would have been too high. In most of these cases, the services provided can be 
viewed as new, productivity-enhancing inputs into the production of rural households. 
This availability of these new producer services represents the connection with the static 
and dynamic models developed in Section 3. 
 
N-Logue has also been able to build partnerships for the delivery of financial 
services. The use of IT kiosks for delivering rural financial services is perhaps potentially 
the most significant example of reducing transaction costs.25 Despite some headway 
made by nationalized banks and credit cooperatives in serving rural markets in India, it is 
not difficult to come across cases of farmers paying monthly interest rates that equal, in 
percentage terms, what corporate or urban household borrowers pay per annum. Bank 
credit is often not available to small farmers, precisely because the transaction costs are 
too high for rural branches of nationalized banks. Microcredit has filled some of the gap, 
but it remains relatively small in total, reflecting its own high transaction costs when 
scaling up microcredit provision is attempted.26 Rural IT kiosks may provide low cost 
delivery points for rural financial services that occupy an empty space between 
microcredit at the low end, and traditional bank branches and cooperatives at the high 
end.  
 
One of the barriers to rural credit provision at reasonable interest rates is the 
continued existence of interlinking.27 Surprisingly, perhaps, this is not just a 
characteristic of ‘backward’ states such as Bihar. For example, in the relatively high-
income state of Punjab, cotton farmers still rely on commission agents who provide input 
credit, guaranteed purchases of output, and some implicit insurance. Reducing transaction 
costs of alternative sources of credit may not be enough to overcome high switching costs 
in such cases, unless transaction costs in input and output markets are also reduced. IT 
                                                 
25 In fact, ICICI bank is working with several rural IT initiatives in other areas of India, in addition to n-
Logue and Drishtee. For example, see ICICI Bank (2004). 
26 For example, Nancy Barry, President Women's World Banking (WWB), USA, states that “You need to 
recognize the transaction costs are high in microfinance… focus on cutting transaction costs in 
microfinance through new technology and channels” Barry (2004). 
27 On this point, see the perceptive comments in Bardhan (1989), where the role of transaction costs in 
interlinking is emphasized. Ray and Sengupta (1989) provide a formal analysis of different types of 
interlinking, and further references. Bardhan and Rudra (1978) performed the seminal empirical work on 
interlinking. For recent empirical work on interlinking in Punjab, see Gill (2003). 
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kiosks have this precise capability. For example, in Nellikuppam district of Tamil Nadu, 
n-Logue has partnered with EID-Parry to improve sugar farmers’ access to information, 
and reduce their transactions costs in dealing with Parry’s large sugar factory in the 
district, through improved tracking and settlements of payments. Combining this 
approach to marketing farmers’ output with new credit channels may provide an 
alternative to traditional interlinking of input credit and output purchases. Parry also 
plans to use those kiosks that are under its own brand to offer processed foods to farmers. 
Thus, it is possible that IT kiosks can reduce transaction costs (and expand variety) in 
three different markets: farm inputs, farm outputs, and manufactured products (of which 
processed foods are one example). 
 
ITC 
ITC stands out among the firms considered here, since it is a large Indian 
corporation serving global markets. Its kiosks are called e-choupals, and they have 
several differentiating features. The key distinguishing factor is that the e-choupals are 
totally designed to support ITC’s agricultural products supply chain. This gives them a 
focus that is not present even in EID-Parry’s kiosks in Nellikuppam. In addition, the e-
choupals are totally owned and set up by ITC, with the operators not having any 
investment or risk of their own. Furthermore, e-choupal operators are always relatively 
well-off farmers, with social standing in the village, and therefore they are always male. 
All these features make the e-choupals different from the two initiatives previously 
described. There are four kinds of e-choupals, tailored very specifically for four different 
products: shrimp, coffee, wheat and soybeans. The first two of these involve large 
commercial farmers, and the focus is on creating Internet access to global market 
information to guide production and supply decisions. There are a few dozen of these e-
choupals. In the case of wheat and soybeans, there are many small farmers, and over 
3,000 e-choupals have been set up, in several states of India. 
  
The description here is based on soy-choupals in Madhya Pradesh state. Wheat-
choupals are quite similar, though the final market and products have some different 
characteristics. Soybeans are pressed to extract oil, which is sold domestically, while the 
remainder is exported as animal feed. Thus they are a cash crop, without the regulated 
market conditions or subsistence consumption associated with a food grain such as 
wheat. Soy-choupals are used as registry points for procurement of soybeans. Actual 
procurement is done at factories and warehouse hubs, but the initial logging in is done 
through the e-choupal, which provides price information and therefore price certainty. In 
fact, the e-choupal price acts as a floor price for procurement – the factory or warehouse 
price can be higher. E-choupals also provide access to local market (mandi) prices and 
global market price information on soybeans and derivative products, to allow farmers to 
compare prices. They give access to operational information, developed by ITC experts, 
pertaining to cropping, seeds, fertilizer, and so on. 
  
E-choupal farmers take an oath to serve the village, and they are trained by ITC. 
While there is an important element of social pressure and pride of work, the operators 
also receive commissions on soybean shipments booked through the e-choupals. This 
provides substantial revenue to the e-choupal operator. The narrow focus of the e-
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choupals and the substantial commitment of financial and human resources by ITC has 
made rapid expansion possible, as well as quick acceptance by farmers. The longer-term 
goal is to use e-choupals and warehouse hubs as sales points for soybean oil, tractor 
rentals, and eventually a range of ITC-produced consumer goods. 
  
The initial benefits of the ITC effort include a substantial reduction in transaction 
costs, from approximately 8 percent of a transaction, down to about 2 percent. It is 
estimated that these gains are shared roughly equally between ITC and individual 
farmers. Some of this gain may be at the expense of traditional intermediaries, who 
operate in mandis, but much of it comes from genuine efficiency gains, including clearer 
quality guidelines and measurement, greater timeliness and reduced wait times, quicker 
payments, and reduced uncertainties. To some extent, traditional intermediaries are co-
opted in the new process, by being hired to perform tasks such as handling payments at 
ITC’s receiving points. Note that traditional intermediaries often have monopoly power, 
which drives a wedge between buyers and sellers that exceeds the value of the services 
provided. In that sense, IT reduces transaction costs by also providing competition in 
intermediation – this is related to the earlier discussion of credit markets.28 Finally, while 
a 6 percent or lower saving may seem quite small, it is worth noting that this is a 
percentage of gross revenue. Hence, it is likely to be a much larger fraction of value 
added. For example, if a farmer’s net profit rate on a transaction is 25 percent of revenue 
before transaction costs, a gain of 3 percent on the transaction through reduced 
transaction costs represents a 12 percent increase in profit. 
 
 Clearly the use of information technology is just a part of ITC’s overhaul of its 
supply chain, but speedy delivery of complex information pertaining to market conditions 
makes IT essential. It might be asked what acts as a check on ITC’s market power in this 
process. The traditional mandi (grain market) system, with its accompanying government 
regulation and oversight, acts as continuing competition. More significantly, ITC’s 
concern with its reputation acts as a disciplining device. Finally, the long-term goal of 
selling back to farmers as customers also gives ITC an incentive to cultivate relationships 
with individual farmers. In fact, farmers view ITC as treating them with much greater 
respect and dignity than is the case in traditional mandi interactions. 
 
All the different IT implementation models illustrate substantial savings of 
transaction costs, and indicate that the result may be new transactions and new products 
being offered. The three organizations discussed here are just some of the increasing 
number of rural IT providers in India. In addition to these private initiatives, there are 
also various government efforts. There are also more focused examples of IT use for 
reducing transaction costs, such as the case of milk cooperatives, where measurement, 
quality testing, and payment are all facilitated by IT use, reducing transaction costs 
substantially. While in most cases the gains are difficult to measure, whatever 
                                                 
28 Of course, IT is not the only possible source of transaction cost reductions, and in some cases, it may be 
of no value. In the ITC case, the value of the information and implicit insurance provided is all dependent 
on the existence of physical market access by road, and ITC’s procurement infrastructure. In other cases, 
however, such as education, crop information, and preliminary medical diagnosis, IT may be valuable even 
in the absence of a transportation infrastructure. I am grateful to T. N. Srinivasan for clarifying this point. 
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quantitative estimates there are suggest that transaction costs can be reduced substantially 
through the use of IT. While the net resource saving must also take account of the fixed 
costs of setting up and maintaining the IT infrastructure, the performance of rural IT 
kiosks run as franchises indicates that they are often able to cover all running costs as 
well as the cost of capital. There is also accumulating evidence of new goods and services 
being provided to rural households through these IT kiosks. While there is no direct 
confirmation of the theoretical model of Section 3, one can argue that the model is 
indicative of the process of development that might be stimulated by the deep penetration 
of IT in rural areas in developing countries. 
 
 
5. Concluding Observations  
 
While the empirical evidence we have provided for the possible positive impacts 
of IT on development came from rural India, one can argue that similar benefits might be 
attainable throughout the economy. To the extent that India, or any developing country, is 
a high transaction cost economy, anything that reduces these transaction costs (whether 
through policy or technology) anywhere in the economy can play a role in stimulating 
development. In particular, if IT can reduce transaction costs for the modern 
manufacturing or services sectors in India, it can have a positive impact there as well. 
India’s use of IT for providing all kinds of outsourcing services to global markets is one 
possible example, since IT’s key role in that case is reducing long-distance 
communication costs. In this paper, we have focused on rural IT use because it is perhaps 
the most striking case, and because the majority of the population of developing countries 
lives in rural areas. 
 
Furthermore, in working out the positive impacts of IT on economic development, we 
have focused here on the channel of reduced transaction costs. However, IT can have 
several other avenues of impact, and we close with a brief discussion of these. For 
example, if IT increases the efficiency of education delivery to the broader population, 
this investment in people (human capital acquisition) is also likely to lead to higher 
growth.29 IT may also have positive impacts on the innovation process. For example, IT 
can make innovation easier by allowing simulation and low-cost testing of new designs 
or searching through possible chemical compounds for beneficial drugs. Also, IT may 
speed the diffusion of innovations through better communications, which may stimulate 
further innovation. IT also allows the stock of existing knowledge to be used more 
efficiently to generate new ideas through combining existing ideas.30  
 
 Some final impacts of IT on development, broadly defined, emerge from the India 
case studies. A factor that seemed to emerge in all cases was the greater average success 
of women kiosk operators, possibly reflecting the fact that there is greater untapped 
potential for rural women, given their otherwise more restricted employment 
opportunities. Certainly, rural IT kiosks provide an important new employment avenue 
                                                 
29 For example, Lucas (1988) is an early growth model emphasizing human capital. Barro (2001) is one of 
many empirical studies exploring the relationship between human capital and growth. 
30 See Weitzman (1998) and Singh (2003) for details of this channel of impact. 
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for women who are constrained by social norms from commuting or migrating for work. 
For both women and men, the kiosk operations were often viewed as boosting self-
esteem, capabilities and awareness of possibilities. This extended beyond the operators 
themselves, to the rural clientele. Children, in particular, were quick to see and seize 
possibilities associated with IT use, including learning new skills, communicating more 
widely, and improving their entertainment options.  
 
These observations can also be related to the growth model considered in Section 
3: in case 2c, the dynamics of the economy depended on expectations, and anything that 
makes these expectations more positive may have long-run impacts.31 In cases where e-
governance services were introduced, there was a heightened awareness of civic roles and 
the responsibilities of government at the local level. While one cannot claim that IT 
automatically provides all these benefits, it is certainly the case, that by providing large 
scale and widespread access to new information, and to new transaction opportunities in 
an affordable manner, IT appears to be poised to play a broad role in economic 
development in countries such as India. 
 
 
                                                 
31 This argument has been made informally, in the context of India’s success in software exports (Kapur, 
2002). Rural IT penetration potentially extends these optimistic expectations to a much broader population. 
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